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“A New Era of Scholarship”?  Hyperobjects 
and Hyperobjects 
Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after 
the End of the World by TIMOTHY 
MORTON 
U of Minnesota P, 2013 $24.95  
Reviewed by BART H. WELLING 
It can be hard to figure out what to do with 
Timothy Morton’s Hyperobjects. To begin 
with, the book is impossible to categorize—
wonderfully so. One of Morton’s keywords 
can be applied to the book itself: it phases 
effortlessly back and forth between 
philosophical polemics, art and music 
criticism, literary theory, pop-cultural play, 
autobiographical reflection, meditations on 
quantum physics and ecology, and more. 
This impatience with disciplinary, generic, 
and nature/culture boundaries—and, 
indeed, with commonsensical views on the 
nature of reality—can make it difficult to 
evaluate some of Morton’s central claims. 
For instance, at one point he triumphantly 
declares that “[q]uantum theory positively 
guarantees that real objects exist!”  This 
exuberance is refreshing, but, in order to 
accept major sections of Morton’s 
argument, non-scientists will have to take 
some of quantum theory’s strangest ideas 
on faith. Moreover, is quantum theory as 
“deeply congruent” with Morton’s brand of 
object-oriented ontology (OOO, also known 
as speculative realism) as he thinks it is? Is 
full interdisciplinary coherence possible 
between physics and ecology, art and 
philosophy? I’m still not sure. On a simpler 
note, many ecocritics would probably 
respond to Morton by pointing out that, 
unlike postmodern solipsists, we don’t need 
quantum physics to prove to us that real 
objects exist.  
  “Ah,” Morton would undoubtedly 
fire back, “but that’s precisely why you 
need quantum theory—because you don’t 
understand what a real object is!” Beyond 
phasing through conventional boundaries 
between academic disciplines and 
rhetorical modes, Hyperobjects raises 
troubling questions about the most basic 
aspects of time and space, including tough 
questions about how we should think about 
and represent a) objects that are too small 
for our senses to perceive, and b) those that 
are too massive and long-“lived” for our 
minds to comprehend—i.e., hyperobjects. 
Morton’s OOO-inspired definition of 
“object” is itself highly debatable, especially 
because it includes human beings and 
animals. Morton is fond of making lists in 
which he playfully mixes humans, 
nonhuman creatures, and other “beings” 
that we normally don’t think of as such.  
“Sure, humans have infinite inner space,” 
he acknowledges, 
But so do nonhumans . . .  Some 
even find it in other “higher” 
primates, some in all sentient 
beings, and some (the real weirdos 
such as myself) in all beings 
whatsoever: eraser, black hole 
singularity, ceramic knife, molasses, 
slug.        
Lists like these decentre human 
consciousness and foreground both the 
autonomy and the interconnectedness of all 
objects—not in a shallow, pop-ecological 
sense—but in a weird (another keyword) 
and uncanny way. Entities from the 
subatomic to the intergalactic level, 
including people, stick to each other like 
melting mirrors, warp spacetime at 
different rates, and inscribe themselves on 
and in each other, but also remain 
profoundly hidden from each other, thanks 
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to the gap between things and perceptions. 
  I mostly agree that this can be a 
productive way of thinking. Hyperobjects 
pushes the sustainability dictum “[t]here is 
no away” to perhaps the furthest possible 
extreme, forcing eco-thinkers not just to 
consider where their water comes from and 
where their garbage goes, but to own up to 
their role in promoting views of capital “N” 
Nature that have ironically contributed to 
the ravaging of the biosphere. Morton 
invites us to open ourselves to disorienting, 
frightening, and even humiliating (yet 
another keyword) face-to-face encounters 
with shadow hyperobjects, such as oil spills 
and plutonium waste, that Nature-lovers 
are deeply entangled with but have worked 
hard to disown; he also stages disorienting 
encounters with works of art that try to 
come to terms with hyperobjects, or that 
simulate their effects on the mind.  
  This is what Morton means by “the 
end of the world”: not some fiery, future 
cataclysm of the kind long foretold by 
environmentalists and doomsday cults, but 
the vertiginous realization that tidy 
categories like “world” and “nature” have 
never come anywhere near approximating 
the weird realities of existence. “The end of 
the world” is an experience in which we are 
stripped of “the false consciousness of gaps 
and backgrounds between and behind 
things.” Morton is a brilliant practitioner as 
well as theorist of what he calls the art of 
“attunement,” in which “[a]rt becomes a 
collaboration between humans and 
nonhumans,” and the artist opens herself or 
himself to “the end of the world” in an 
attempt to (re)create this experience in 
others. At many points throughout the 
book, Morton manages to produce the 
kinds of “massive, counterintuitive 
perspective shift[s]” that he admires in the 
work of artists as diverse as the band My 
Bloody Valentine and the Australian 
Aboriginal painter Yukultji Napangati. “I’m 
not saying we need to uproot the trees,” he 
stresses; “I’m saying that we need to smash 
the aestheticization[.]” Unlike the Trinity 
nuclear test orchestrated by Robert 
Oppenheimer, whose infamous reference 
to the Bhagavad Gita (“I am become death, 
the shatterer of worlds”) supplies the 
epigraph to Hyperobjects, Morton’s world-
shattering project could actually be good 
for the biosphere. Some false worlds clearly 
need to be shattered (I vote for TV 
commercials.)  
  Other worlds, however, can only be 
destroyed at a terrible cost. I hope that in 
the future Morton will more fully address 
the ethical, rhetorical, and political 
implications of categorizing people and 
nonhuman beings as “objects,” however 
much his definition differs from the 
common one. In the “mesocosm” we all 
inhabit, being an object means something 
very different for Western thinkers than it 
does for animals on factory farms, or for 
people like the Japanese victims of 
Oppenheimer’s labours, who deserve more 
attention than they get in Hyperobjects. 
While everyone and everything on Earth 
has been irradiated by nuclear fallout and 
affected by pollution and global warming to 
some degree, I hope that Morton will 
devote some more thought to the 
asymmetrical socio-ecological impacts of 
hyperobjects in what he calls the “Age of 
Asymmetry.” From a quantum theory 
perspective, Morton may be right that 
“‘distance’ is only a psychic and ideological 
construct designed to protect me from the 
nearness of things,” but there’s no question 
that distance is going to keep mattering in 
terms of environmental justice. 
  Furthermore, while quantum theory 
shows that human and nonhuman minds, 
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like everything else, are ultimately made of 
subatomic particles, and ecology shows that 
they are inextricably stuck in what Morton 
calls the “mesh” with hyperobjects like 
global warming, minds follow very different 
sets of rules than either quarks or 
tornadoes. Morton persuades me that 
attunement to hyperobjects is possible and 
sometimes even necessary, but surely this 
state can only be temporary. Wouldn’t 
permanent attunement entail total mental 
paralysis, psychosis, or death? Just as 
distance may be an illusion, it may be true 
that “the pencil you are holding in your 
fingers is only a rigid extended body on 
account of a false immediacy,” but where 
would we sentient life-forms be without our 
evolved ability to perceive distance, our 
faith in our normally adequate everyday 
experiences of the physical world?  
Leopards presumably do not pause while 
attacking gazelles to wonder whether 
surging adrenaline and the taste of blood 
are products of a “false immediacy”; 
quantum theorists most likely use pencils 
like everyone else.  On the messy 
“mesocosmic” level of existence where we 
feel and believe that we spend our lives, 
concepts like “distance” and “lifeworld” are 
not false, and they aren’t just concepts, 
human or otherwise—they structure 
bodies, behaviours, communities, and 
cultures throughout the biosphere.  
  By extension, while schools of 
thought such as utilitarianism, process 
relationism, and even ecocriticism may 
break down, as Morton argues, when 
confronting quantum-level objects and 
hyperobjectual timescales, I believe that 
they still have much to offer when dealing 
with problems pertaining to nonhuman and 
human lifeworlds in what we take to be 
“real” spacetime. I hope that in his future 
work Morton will bring speculative realism 
into dialogue with some form of 
psychological realism, and that one 
philosophical tradition not mentioned in his 
book—pragmatism—will receive plenty of 
attention. Morton displays an openness to 
this way of thinking in his description of one 
theoretical response to a hyperobject: the 
Nuclear Guardianship movement’s idea of 
encasing plutonium in gold. Not only would 
this approach transform a lethal, reviled 
substance into “an object of 
contemplation” and “a member of a 
democracy expanded beyond the human,” 
but, as Morton notes, gold “has the 
advantage of absorbing gamma rays.” This 
could be an aesthetically powerful and 
ecologically effective way of keeping the 
plutonium from contaminating the 
lifeworlds that will mean everything to our 
descendants and their nonhuman 
neighbours.  
  What should we do with 
Hyperobjects, and with hyperobjects 
themselves? Understandably, Morton 
seems conflicted on both counts. On one 
hand, he rejects constructivism, which he 
defines as the Wordsworthian view of the 
work of art as “a machine for upgrading the 
mind of the viewer.” Morton writes that 
“The wish of constructivism is an if-only: if 
only I could displace you enough, dear 
reader, the world would change.” This wish 
is misguided, he argues, in an era both of 
too much information and of hard-core 
denialism—and, of course, of hyperobjects 
that cannot be “solved,” especially not by 
the same logics and technologies that 
created them, and which thus expose 
human hypocrisy, weakness, and lameness 
(more keywords) at every turn. Art 
becomes “grief-work” rather than “PR for 
climate change,” and criticism becomes 
“attunement to the nonhuman,” a form of 
meditative practice, rather than activism. At 
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the same time, doing nothing is not an 
option for the Prius-driving Morton, who 
also rejects cynicism, nihilism, and the 
radical environmentalist perspective on 
humans as a planetary virus that can only 
be “cured” via a mass die-off. The book 
frequently drops hints (such as the 
plutonium-in-gold example) about modes of 
action that, while they will inevitably be 
insufficient and wrong on some level, may 
be as imperative as saving a child from a 
speeding truck. And Morton clearly believes 
that thinking about hyperobjects 
constitutes one of these modes. If he 
refuses to give us confident ten-point 
“action plans” for dealing with 
hyperobjects—and this reticence, like the 
book’s exuberant weirdness, is itself 
admirable in an age of “endless maps and 
graphs”—he nonetheless adopts what looks 
very much like a constructivist stance vis-à-
vis mainstream academic thought. “We are 
entering a new era of scholarship,” he 
announces in his final chapter, “where the 
point will not be to one-up each other by 
appealing to the trace of the givenness of 
the openness of the clearing of the lighting 
of the being of the pencil.” Hyperobjects 
doesn’t tell us how to stop global warming, 
but it succeeds brilliantly as an act of 
intellectual provocation. It may not shatter 
the too-cozy lifeworlds of some 
contemporary scholars, but it will open up 
some cracks in these worlds and expose 
others that have been there all along. It 
phases, it sticks to you, it terrifies, it warps 
spacetime; in short, it measures up to its 
own definition of hyperobjects. Does it 
represent the beginning of a “new era of 
scholarship”? One can only hope.  
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